In this paper, we analyze the impact of credit rating changes on the pricing and liquidity of US corporate bonds. In particular, we address the question of whether the informativeness of rating events varies in dierent economic environments, particularly after the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act. During the nancial crisis, rating agencies and ratingcontingent regulation were blamed for causing inated (overly optimistic and often stale) ratings, triggering, to some extent, the near collapse of the nancial system, and leading to important regulatory reforms. It is essential, therefore, to understand the impact of downgrades/upgrades on prices and trading activity, particularly in the aftermath of these reforms. We nd that the informativeness of rating changes is low before the crisis, particularly for nancial bonds. However, after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, rating changes lead to signicantly stronger market reactions for non-nancial bonds, whereas the reactions are weaker for nancial bonds, indicating that the new regulatory framework has ambiguous eects for the impact of such changes. We link this nding to the dierence in complexity of the securities by testing various hypotheses based on existing models of rating agency behavior in dierent regulatory and economic environments. JEL-Classication: G01, G12, G24
Introduction
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) represent an important source of information for market participants in determining the creditworthiness of corporations. CRAs assess the ability of a rm to respect its obligations by reecting it in a rating grade representing the probability of default and, in some cases, additionally the expected recovery rate. The informativeness of ratings is accentuated by rating-contingent regulation, which makes it necessary for certain investors (for example, banks and insurance companies) to take ratings into account in their lending, investment and asset allocation strategies.
However, the recent nancial crisis, accompained by massive and sudden downgrades of investment grade securities in 2008 and 2009, has severely undermined the reputation of CRAs, bringing into question their business model. Since CRAs are paid by the issuers who request a credit rating, this mechanism can lead to a conict of interest, incentivizing CRAs to provide overly optimistic (inated) ratings and also react too slowly when negative information arrives.
Such incentives, along with the regulatory advantage for better rated securities, favors the diusion of potentially unreasonably high and sticky ratings, i.e., ratings with poor informativeness. This is one of the elements that is widely considered to be a causal factor of the nancial crisis, with resultant massive downgrades and defaults of highly rated securities, in the period after the Lehman bankruptcy. 1 The principal regulatory response to the nancial crisis is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act [2010] (known popularly as Dodd-Frank), enacted on July 21 st , 2010. Dodd-Frank aims at a fundamental reform, in many areas, of the US nancial system.
In particular, in "Title IX-Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities" the "Subtitle C-Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies" includes provisions concerning the credit rating industry and its interaction with the market. An aim of the regulators is to improve rating informativeness by making rating agencies legally liable when they provide misleading information to the market. In particular, with Dodd-Frank, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can more easily sanction rating agencies, and also courts are more likely to entertain private actions against CRAs. 2 Moreover, under the new rules, 1 See, for example Opp et al. [2013] and Krugman [2010] 2 According to section 933, the statements of CRAs should be considered as "statements made by a registered public accounting rm or a securities analyst under the securities laws" and not "forward-looking statements". Additionally, in private actions, it is sucient to prove that the agency "knowingly or recklessly failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security" or "to obtain reasonable verication" of the information provided with the rating. rating-contingent regulation has to be gradually dismantled, in order to eliminate the regulatory advantage of highly rated securities previously mentioned as a relevant factor among the causes of the nancial crisis.
One of the markets most heavily aected by this new regulation is the US corporate bond market, where credit ratings play a major role. In this market, trades take place over-the-counter (OTC), and all relevant credit information is not easily accessible by investors. In particular, bonds of certain issuers, e.g., bonds issued by nancial rms, are more complex to rate as the risk of their assets is dicult to evaluate based on public information only. Thus, credit ratings are important in assessing credit risk. However, in contrast to most other OTC markets, detailed transaction data are available on prices and volumes. Such a dataset is provided by the Financial Industry Regulatory Agency (FINRA), and is known as the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). This database aggregates virtually all transactions in this market, contributing to greater transparency. Thus, the US corporate bond market provides an ideal environment for studying the eect of rating changes.
In this paper, we analyze how dierent economic environments and, in particular, the introduction of Dodd-Frank, have altered the impact of rating agency decisions on prices and liquidity in the US corporate bond market. We test various hypotheses based on existing theoretical models, drawing mainly from the predictions of the models in Skreta and Veldkamp [2009] and Opp et al. [2013] , and integrating them with the ndings of He and Milbradt [2014] , who consider the liquidity eect of changes in credit risk. First, we test whether the incentive to provide inated ratings is indeed high in good economic times, i.e., before the crisis, particularly for more complex securities, as suggested, e.g., by Skreta and Veldkamp [2009] , and has been argued in the aftermath of the crisis. In addition, we analyze the market reactions around regulatory rating thresholds, e.g., between investment grade and speculative grade bonds. Second, we test the prediction that the informativeness of rating changes is high in crisis periods. In such periods, the credit quality of corporate bonds is low, i.e., rms are exposed to greater credit risk, and their outside options, such as nancing using equity or loans, are less attractive. According to the model of Opp et al. [2013] , the CRAs' benets from inating ratings are lower in such times, leading to more information acquisition by them and, thus, resulting in more informative ratings.
Furthermore, there is additional interaction between credit and liquidity risk in crisis periods, potentially increasing their price and liquidity impacts. 3 Third, we analyze whether eliminating 3 See Friewald et al. [2012] for a documentation of this interaction eect during periods of nancial crisis. rating-contingent regulation and increasing the cost of biased ratings, following the introduction of Dodd-Frank, leads to an improvement in the informativeness of credit ratings. Interestingly, in the model of Opp et al. [2013] , the opposite eect may be observed for more complex securities, because, after eliminating the incentives set by rating-contingent regulation to rate these securities, rating agencies may simply stop acquiring information for these securities given that the costs are too high.
Our sample covers corporate bond ratings from 2003 to 2014 including 6,594 rating events with 4,332 downgrades and 2,162 upgrades. We analyze three sample periods: rating changes before the crisis, during the crisis and recession, and after the passage of Dodd-Frank. Moreover, we split the sample between bonds of non-nancial rms (hereafter non-nancial bonds) and bonds of nancial rms (hereafter nancial bonds), considering the latter to be more complex to rate given their exposure to multiple risk factors. We set up a time window of 181 working days around the rating event (the event day, 90 days before and 90 days after the event) covering all transactions in this window.
In our empirical analysis, we nd that rating informativeness is indeed low before the crisis, with nancial bonds being less informative overall, with an average price variation of -0.59% opposed to -0.71% for non-nancial bonds, in the case of downgrades. In addition, we conrm that downgrades are more important for market participants than upgrades: the price reaction for downgrades is almost double that for upgrades. During the crisis, both nancial and nonnancial bonds show the highest price reactions. This arises in a backdrop of a signicant increase in illiquidity, which is particularly high for non-nancial bonds. After Dodd-Frank, downgrades of non-nancial bonds are signicantly more informative than before the crisis: in the latter period the price decrease amounts to -1.12%. On the other hand, downgrades of nancial bonds produce less information for the market, triggering an eect of only -0.31% and, thus, indicating a much weaker reaction for more complex bonds. A regression analysis conrms these results, while providing a better understanding of the determinants of price variations surrounding downgrades and upgrades. In addition, we show that price reactions are stronger when the changes in trading activity and liquidity are higher. Interestingly, before the crisis, there is a stronger eect when a bond is downgraded from investment to speculative grade. Nevertheless, this eect almost disappears after Dodd-Frank, which might be a direct consequence of the trend towards eliminating rating-contingent regulation. Finally, through the estimation of market-implied ratings, we analyze whether rating changes are anticipated by market participants, and whether this expectation is dierent across the three periods. We nd that downgrades are anticipated before the crisis, but not after Dodd-Frank. Thus, it appears that the staleness of ratings before downgrades almost disappeared after the introduction of the new regulation. Interestingly, upgrades are instead more expected after Dodd-Frank than before the crisis, indicating that CRAs are more reluctant to upgrade bonds, as a consequence of the potentially asymmetric litigation risk: the penalty from optimistic ratings increased dramatically relative to the benets of such issuer-friendly ratings.
Overall, our paper provides a detailed analysis of how the market reaction to corporate rating changes has varied through the nancial crisis, and following the new regulation introduced by Dodd-Frank. Our ndings go beyond what is currently available in the literature on corporate ratings. We provide detailed evidence analyzing the whole corporate bond market and add new results on trading activity and liquidity, which represent an important second dimension on how the market reacts to credit rating changes. While the price eects of rating changes are important, the liquidity consequences are equally so, since they inuence portfolio choices and may even feed back to prices. Moreover, we provide interesting evidence on price eects by separating nancial bonds from non-nancial bonds, and by discussing the dierent eects observed during and after the nancial crisis. Additionally, we estimate implied ratings, which help to complete the general picture by providing evidence on how the market is able to anticipate rating movements in dierent economic and regulatory environments. Finally, we link our empirical evidence with recent theoretical studies concerning the strategic behavior of CRAs and the interaction between corporate bonds' default risk and market liquidity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature, Section 3 discusses the hypotheses, Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 presents the methodology and Section 6 the results.
Literature Review
This paper is related to three strands of the literature. The rst set of papers includes studies of the announcement eect of bond credit ratings and credit outlook changes on bond and stock returns. The second strand focuses on theoretical and empirical research regarding the strategic behavior of rating agencies. The third group consists of papers that analyze the liquidity of the corporate bond market, in general.
Previous empirical papers analyze the price reaction of credit rating changes and seem to generally support the hypothesis that these changes signicantly aect returns. 4 Most of these papers report signicantly stronger price reactions for credit downgrades compared to upgrades, however focusing mainly on stock returns. There is not as much agreement in the literature about whether there is bond market anticipation of these rating changes, and also whether the ratings' outlook aect bond prices. Overall, the dierent magnitudes and varying statistical signicance of price eects in the literature on bond ratings can be attributed to the great variety of sample periods, methodologies and datasets used by researchers. The last is especially crucial when it comes to corporate bonds, as the studies mentioned above typically rely on data reecting a small sub-set of the market and, moreover, relying mainly on monthly bond data, which signicantly decreases the power of the tests of these eects in comparison with daily data. 5 These limitations could be overcome to a large extent since the creation of the TRACE dataset by the FINRA, which collects price and volume data for all the transactions in the US corporate bond market. Using this dataset, May [2010] studies the impact of bond rating changes on corporate bond prices using a sample period up to 2009. Signicant abnormal returns are found both around downgrades and upgrades, while the cross-sectional analysis shows that these eects are stronger for unexpected rating changes, rms with a lower rating, and for upgrades from speculative to investment grade. Ellul et al. [2011] concentrate on downgrades from investment to speculative grade of bonds held by insurance companies. Fire sales of downgraded bonds caused by regulatory constraints are documented, with those eects being more likely for rms with more severe regulatory constraints, especially when the overall insurance industry is in distress.
The paper that is most closely related to ours is Dimitrov et al. [2015] , which is the rst to examine the impact of Dodd-Frank on credit ratings by analyzing non-nancial bonds in the US corporate bond market. The motivation for their analysis is the possibility of stricter regulatory penalties if the ratings are inated. Their empirical evidence suggests that after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010, CRAs issue lower ratings and downgrades are less informative for the market, with similar eects observed for upgrades. Given that Dodd-Frank penalizes in- 4 The rst papers to analyze credit rating eects on bond prices were Weinstein [1977] , Wakeman [1978] , and Wansley and Clauretie [1985] . They found no eect, whereas Katz [1974] , Grier and Katz [1976] , and Ingram et al. [1983] did. More recently, signicant eects in the stock price are found only for downgrades in Holthausen and Leftwich [1986] , Hand et al. [1992] , Grin and Sanvicente [1982] , Goh and Ederington [1993] , Nayar and Roze [1994] , Norden and Weber [2004] , Li et al. [2006] . However, Hsueh and Liu [1992] , Dichev and Piotroski [2001] , Jorion et al. [2005] , and Kim and Nabar [2007] nd signicant stock price eects in upgrades and downgrades, while Hand et al. [1992] and Hite and Warga [1997] nd the same for bonds.
5 See, for example, Bessembinder et al. [2009] . ated ratings, the authors conclude that CRAs become protective of their reputation and lower their ratings, regardless of the underlying information. This paper presents the rst important insights regarding the impact of Dodd-Frank on credit ratings, and provides a good starting point for our analysis. Our paper oers signicant new insights, given that we add liquidity as a second important dimension after that of prices, analyze the whole market including nancial and non-nancial bonds, and carefully consider eects during and after the nancial crisis in our results.
A recent and growing literature tackles the strategic behavior of rating agencies, and the changes in rating standards, both theoretically and empirically. Skreta and Veldkamp [2009] show in a model how more complex assets incentivize rating shopping, and, consequently rating ination.
An important theoretical contribution is Opp et al. [2013] , which develops a theoretical model explaining the variation in credit rating standards over time, and across asset classes. This model suggests that the introduction of rating-contingent regulation, which favors highly rated securities, increases the volume of highly rated securities, independently of the eect it has on information. The impact on informativeness depends on an endogenous threshold level of the regulatory advantage, beyond which the rating agency is better o by terminating information acquisition and inating its credit rating. The threshold depends on the complexity of the security, the credit quality of the issuer and the issuer's outside options. Given rating-contingent regulation, the model predicts lower rating informativeness during booms, in general. What is more important, the model predicts that the elimination of ratings-based regulation leads to higher informativeness. However, such an eect might be reversed if the security is too complex (i.e., costly) to be rated. Additionally, Cohn et al. [2015] model the interaction between the CRAs' monitoring and the issuer's manipulation of the information provided to them. They nd that greater monitoring can have distortive eect on the ratings' informativeness, given that it might increase the issuer's incentive to manipulate. Specically, they predict that a regulation that increases the CRAs' monitoring incentives, for example by imposing higher sanctions on
CRAs as under Dodd-Frank, can have ambiguous eects on rating informativeness. Furthermore, Becker and Milbourn [2011] , Bolton et al. [2012] and Bongaerts et al. [2012] analyze how increased competition aects the credit rating market, nding that such competition lowers the quality of ratings, reduces eciency through rating shopping, and makes additional rating changes more likely for regulatory purposes. Alp [2013] examines the time-series variation of corporate rating standards, nding a structural shift towards stricter ratings in 2002, which cannot be completely explained by market conditions. Baghai et al. [2014] analyze the consequences of the shift to more conservative ratings on the rms' capital structure. They nd that rms aected by such conservatism issue less debt, and that the market does not perceive the increase in conservatism to be fully warranted. In a more recent model, Sangiorgi and Spatt [2015] show how imposing regulatory disclosure to the market of all the ratings an issuer has obtained can improve rating informativeness, and, therefore, investment decisions based on them.
The eects of rating changes on corporate bond prices are closely related to market liquidity,
given the low level of trading activity in the corporate bond market, in general. Since the creation of TRACE, this has motivated many researchers to focus on the analysis of corporate bond market liquidity. These papers quantify various aspects of trading costs and activity for dierent market segments, time periods and particular events, e.g., defaults. 6 In addition, theoretical models, e.g., He and Milbradt [2014] , study the interaction between default and liquidity in the corporate bond market, which arises endogenously in a loop via the roll-over channel: lower rated bonds are linked to lower liquidity. Such feedback eects are particularly important when analyzing the market reaction to credit events and, therefore, allows us to formulate hypotheses related to liquidity.
Hypotheses
The main research question that we address in this paper, is whether the nancial crisis and the subsequent introduction of Dodd-Frank have fundamentally changed the informativeness of ratings. In this context, rating informativeness is measured by the price and liquidity impact of rating changes. If secondary market prices and liquidity (i.e., trading volume and transaction costs) are not aected by rating changes, market participants obviously consider the information transmitted by the rating changes as weak. 7 This is either because the rating changes do not reect the signaling value of the new information or this information is already incorporated in prices. When comparing rating changes before and after Dodd-Frank, it is important to carefully consider the eects of the nancial crisis, since credit rating eects could be fundamentally 6 Hotchkiss and Jostova [2007] analyze the determinants of trading volume and liquidity of corporate bonds. Bao et al. [2011] document the illiquidiy to be signicantly higher than what is explicable by the bid-ask spread. Dick-Nielsen et al. [2012] and Friewald et al. [2012] document a dramatic increase in the contribution of illiquidity to corporate bond spreads during the nancial crisis. Jankowitsch et al. [2014] study the eect of corporate bond defaults on the trading microstructure.
7 Note that we focus on rating events and not on changes in rating outlook, as only actual rating changes are directly relevant for rating-contingent regulation. dierent in such economic downturns. In light of these considerations, we provide hypotheses based on the three dierent periods (before the crisis, during the crisis and after Dodd-Frank), and are particularly interested in comparing the rst and last periods.
The hypotheses we present in this section are directly based on the recent theoretical and empirical literature, discussed in Section 2. The main references we draw from are Opp et al. [2013] and He and Milbradt [2014] . Opp et al. [2013] develop a theoretical model of credit rating standards over time and across asset classes. Furthermore, their model also allows us to base our predictions on the complexity of the rated securities. In the context of the US corporate bond market, this is particularly interesting as certain issuers are more dicult to evaluate. In particular, Morgan [2002] provides evidence that bonds of nancial issuers are much more complex to rate. The main point is that the risk of the assets is dicult to evaluate and, in addition, their exposure to risk factors can be changed quickly using derivatives. Considering liquidity, He and Milbradt [2014] provide evidence that price and liquidity impacts of rating changes might be stronger in a crisis period, in addition to the arguments in Opp et al. [2013] . Due to the liquidity risk associated with rolling over corporate debt in a crisis, there are clear feedback eects of illiquidity interacting with credit risk in their model. These conditions lead to: Hypothesis 1. The informativeness of credit ratings for corporate bonds is low before the crisis, particularly for complex bonds, with the strongest price variations occurring around regulatory rating thresholds.
The low informativeness comes directly from the ndings of Opp et al. [2013] : before the crisis, rating-contingent regulation was in place, and the economy was in an expansionary phase. Thus, the endogenous threshold level of the regulatory advantage is lower, beyond which the rating agency is better o by terminating information acquisition and inating the rating. In addition, a stronger market reaction around the regulatory threshold is intuitively appealing, and also empirically supported by many papers in the literature. 8 In addition, under the assumption of nancial bonds being more complex instruments, acquiring information is more costly for bonds issued by nancial rms. Hence, the threshold level of regulatory advantage is lower and rating ination is more pronounced. This is in line with the model of Skreta and Veldkamp [2009] , which links asset complexity to rating ination via rating shopping.
Hypothesis 2. The informativeness of credit rating changes for corporate bonds is high in the crisis period, and is associated with high illiquidity.
In a crisis period, the credit quality of corporate bonds is low, i.e., rms are exposed to greater credit risk, and their outside options, e.g., nancing using equity or loans, are less attractive.
Following the theoretical literature, the CRAs' benets from inating ratings are lower, and there is more information acquisition and, thus, more informative ratings. Furthermore, there is additional interaction between credit and liquidity risk, as discussed in He and Milbradt [2014] , potentially increasing the price and liquidity impacts. In line with this theory, the empirical evidence in US suggests that the corporate bond market experienced an extremely high level of illiquidity during the global nancial crisis, as shown by Friewald et al. [2012] . Thus, we expect to nd particularly large price and liquidity eects during a nancial crisis.
Hypothesis 3. The regulations in the Dodd-Frank Act caused an improvement in the informativeness of credit ratings, but the eect may be the opposite for complex bonds.
Removing the regulatory advantage for highly rated securities (through the increased liability of CRAs and the elimination of rating-contingent regulation) increases rating informativeness for both upgrades and downgrades. However, Opp et al. [2013] show that if a security is too complex to be rated, the eect could be reversed as information acquisition is too costly. 9 Interestingly, Dodd-Frank not only eliminated the regulatory advantage of credit ratings, but also introduced an asymmetry with regard to litigation risk, allowing for additional announcement eects. As argued by Dimitrov et al. [2015] on the basis of Goel and Thakor [2011] , it is much more likely for CRAs to be sued for an optimistically biased rating rather than for a pessimistic one. This leads to asymmetric penalties between biased downgrades and upgrades. Consequently, CRAs are much more reluctant to upgrade a bond, given the increased litigation risk. Thus, in the case of less information acquisition by the rating agency, dierences between downgrades and upgrades might emerge.
Data
Our data set represents credit downgrades and upgrades of US corporate bonds between January 2003 and May 2014 obtained from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). We 9 Ambiguous eects on rating informativeness from the introduction of a regulation that incentivizes higher issuer's monitoring by the CRAs have been demonstrated also in Cohn et al. [2015] .
consider the ratings of the three main rating agencies for our analysis: Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch. We exclude default or close-to-default events (i.e., downgrades to CCC-, Caa3 or lower and upgrades from CCC-, Caa3 or lower), which might be strongly inuenced by asymmetric information and strategic behavior related to the default event. 10 Furthermore, we consider only straight, callable or puttable bonds, excluding all others with complex structures as the price reaction of these bonds might be mainly driven by embedded options. 11 We also consider only bonds with an amount issued greater than or equal to $10 million.
We set up a time window of 181 working days around the rating event (the event day, 90 days before and 90 days after the event). Inside that window, we collect the transaction data of the downgraded/upgraded bonds from TRACE. Since July 2002, following an initiative of FINRA with the aim of bringing more transparency to the market, all transactions in US corporate bonds must be registered in the TRACE system by broker-dealers within 15 minutes of their execution; the relevant information provided includes the bond price as a percentage of the face value and the volume traded, among other details. 12 We cleanse the transaction data of errors using the algorithm described in Dick-Nielsen [2009] . In particular, we delete duplicates, trade corrections and trade cancellations in the same day. Moreover, we remove reversals, which are errors detected on a day subsequent the initial trade. Additionally, we implement the price lters used in Edwards et al. [2007] and Friewald et al. [2012] . Specically, we adopt a reversal lter, that should eliminate extreme price movements, and a median lter, which indenties outliers in prices reported in TRACE within a time period.
Given the high illiquidity of the corporate bond market, we only include bonds that have one or more trades in at least 15 out of 90 days before and, again, 15 out of 90 days after the event, similar to Jankowitsch et al. [2014] . Moreover, we only consider bonds which, over the event day and 5 days after, either have an average cumulative daily volume of at least $1 million or have an average volume per trade of $100,000. This allows us to exclude downgrades and upgrades of bonds where price and liquidity impacts are mainly driven by retail investors. 13 Our nal sample contains 6,594 events, of which 4,332 are downgrades and 2,162 are upgrades. Table 1 contains a detailed description of the distribution of downgrades and upgrades over the rating grades and periods. We observe 3,178 downgrades of nancial bonds and 1,254 of 10 Default events in the US corporate bond market have been extensively covered in Jankowitsch et al. [2014] . 11 Convertibles, asset backed, exchangeable, foreign currency, perpetual and bonds with other complex optionalities are thus excluded from the nal sample.
12 Note that the volume data in TRACE are capped at $5 million for investment-grade bonds and at $1 million for high yield bonds.
13 Note that our main results hold if those bonds are included in the sample.
non-nancial bonds: this considerable dierence is mainly driven by the crisis period, when an extremely large number of downgrades occurred in the nancial sector. In contrast, upgrades are less divergent between the two sectors: 1,338 and 826 are for nancial and non-nancial bonds, respectively. We match the sample with bond characteristics taken from the Mergent dataset and rm characteristics obtained from Compustat. In particular, in our analysis we use coupon, maturity, amount issued, ination-corrected total assets and intangible assets. Table 2 presents summary statistics of the bond and rm characteristics.
Methodology
This section presents the methodology applied to measure the eect of rating changes on prices and liquidity. We present, here, our denitions of the three analyzed time periods, bond price and liquidity impacts, and various types of rating-related variables. We also present the regression setup that we use in our analysis.
Time Periods of Interest
We dene three time periods that include the nancial crisis and the subsequent regulatory ance Commissioners (NAIC) has eliminated reference to credit ratings only for residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities but "still continues to rely on rating agencies for other asset classes", as documented in NAIC [2015] . 16 Note that our results are robust to variations in the denition of the three time periods.
In this respect, we additionally provide tests for structural breaks following Andrews [1993] in the Appendix. Overall, these results conrm our choice of time periods. As expected, we nd a structural break in the nancial crisis around the Lehman default, conrming that the nancial crisis leads to signicant dierent market reactions. In addition, we nd for both nancial and non-nancial bonds that a structural break occurs in mid 2010. Thus, the introduction of Dodd-Frank can be linked to this second structural break. Further details on the methodology and the results of these tests are presented in the Appendix.
Price and Liquidity Impacts
For each rating event in our sample, we consider a time window of 181 days (the event day, 90 days before and 90 days after the event) and observe all transactions related to the aected bond.
In a rst step, we calculate daily measures of price and liquidity and, in a second, we estimate the impact of the rating event on these measures.
Volume Weighted Average Daily Price
We use a volume weighted measure for the price, also applied by Bessembinder et al. [2009] , for example. This measure places more weight in prices arising from transactions with higher volume, reducing the noise introduced by smaller, potentially unrepresentative trades. The volume weighted daily average price P it of bond i on day t is given by
where p is the price observed for transaction j, with a volume of v, and n is the number of transactions on day t.
Trading Activity
The trading activity can be identied both by the frequency and volume of trading. Thus, our rst measure is the daily trading frequency, which is the number of the transactions n it in bond i, on day t. The second measure of trading activity we adopt is the cumulative daily volume V it , which is the sum of the volume of transactions of bond i on day t given by:
where v is the volume of transaction j.
Transaction Costs
The metric we use to capture liquidity is the price dispersion measure, introduced in Jankowitsch et al. [2011] . This is a direct estimate of transaction costs, based on the dispersion of the individual traded prices around the fundamental value of the bond, which is given by the average price, in this case. We calculate a daily measure of price dispersion D it for bond i on day t as
where p is the price, v the volume of transaction j, and n is the number of transactions on day t. At least two transactions of bond i on day t are needed in order to calculate the measure.
Many other liquidity measures are available to quantify transaction cost, e.g., the Amihud or Roll measures (see, Friewald et al. [2012] for a discussion). However, the price dispersion measure is ideal in the setting of corporate bond markets, as it does not require a long time-series for its estimation, and is robust to eects from retail trading. 17
Price and Liquidity Eects
Based on the daily price and liquidity measures, we consider a time window from 5 days before to 5 days after the rating change. The price and liquidity impacts are dened by the dierence between the average of the daily measure across the 5 days before the event, and the average across the event day and 5 days after. 18 Note that the observed price changes could arise due to market-wide movements of other factors, such as the risk-free interest rate. Thus, as an alternative denition of price impact, we consider the eect of the risk-free rate by estimating the price change of a duration matched risk-free zero-coupon bond in the same time window, and adjust the observed price change (i.e., subtracting the risk-free price change). 19
Rating-Related Variables
In our analysis, we use dierent variables that are related to the credit rating or its change during the event. In a rst step, we assign integer values to the dierent rating grades, starting from 1 for the highest to 21 for the lowest (see Table 1 ). This rating number allows us to construct various related variables.
We dene the number of notches as the dierence between the rating number before and after the event indicating by how much the downgrade/upgrade moved the bond rating. Intuitively, the more levels the rating is changed, the stronger we would expect the price reaction to be.
Furthermore, we use a variable related to the rating threshold implied by the rating-contingent regulation in place before Dodd-Frank, when, especially for nancial institutions, investment grade bonds had a preferred treatment. In order to analyze whether this eect is present in our sample, and whether it changed after Dodd-Frank, we include a dummy variable for rating changes that cross the investment-speculative rating threshold.
Note that every event in our sample is related to a rating change by one of the three main rating agencies (Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch). Based on the information from these rating agencies, we include the number of agencies indicating how many CRAs rate the bond at the time of the rating change. In addition, we calculate the rating dispersion representing the average absolute dierence of the ratings of the three dierent agencies on the day the rating change occurs. This variable allows us to analyze whether a higher disagreement among rating agencies leads to stronger price eects.
Implied Ratings
We also derive market-implied ratings to analyze whether rating changes are anticipated by the market. If the price information of bonds indicates an anticipation of future rating events, we could conclude that the additional information provided by the actual event is low. We measure market anticipation by estimating a market-implied rating based on the observed bond yields in the whole US corporate bond market. For every rating event, we specify a time window from 90 days to 30 days before the event. 20 We calculate the mean of the yield spread for each rating grade of the agency involved in the particular event across all days and bonds traded in the market. 21 Thereby, we derive, for each rating grade, an average market yield spread related to each rating event. In the next step, we t the following nonlinear model across rating grades:
where y is the market yield spread calculated as above and i is the rating number. Based on the estimates for a and b, the implied rating of a bond between 90 to 30 days before its downgrade/upgrade is given by
where y is the average yield spread across 90 to 30 days before the rating change of the bond that is to be downgraded/upgraded. For each rating event, we compute the dierence between the numerical rating of the bond preceding the rating change and the implied rating of the same bond, as a measure of the gap between the rating and the market. If the dierence is negative, the implied rating is worse than the actual rating of the bond, which can be seen as an anticipation of the forthcoming downgrade from the market, i.e., the rating implied by the bond yield has already incorporated the upcoming deterioration of the rating after the future downgrade.
Regression Analysis
We use a pooled regression model to investigate the determinants of changes in bond prices, where the dependent variable is given by the price change adjusted by the risk-free rate change, calculated as described in 5.2. The regression equation that explains the price variation related to the rating change of bond i of rm s, on day t, from the rating agency u is given by: y i,t,s,u = α + β(T ime P eriod Dummies) t + γ(Rating-Related V ariables) i,t,s,u + δ(Changes in Liquidity and T rading Activity) i,t,s
Thus, this specication combines the entire time-series and the cross-section of price changes.
In the construction of our regression sample, whenever there are bonds of the same rm which are downgraded/upgraded on the same day, from the same rating agency, to and from the same rating grade, we take the average of our regression variables and consider it as one observation.
In this manner, we avoid the concern of a single event showing up in the regression with multiple observations and potentially biasing the results. We run the regressions with standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the rm level. 22 In addition, we present regressions that are run for each time period separately, allowing us to analyze changes in the model parameters over time.
Results
This section provides the empirical analysis of market reactions to rating changes. For all rating events, we examine the time interval from 90 days before to 90 days after the rating events.
We focus on the price changes but, in addition, cover metrics of changes in trading activity and liquidity for the three dened periods. First, we provide graphical representations of these timeseries and, in the main analysis, test the statistical signicance of the observed changes directly around the event dates, i.e., from 5 days before to 5 days after the events. Second, we employ regression models to analyze the determinants of the price variations. Third, we explore whether market-implied ratings predict rating changes, and whether this relation changes over time.
Price, Trading Activity and Liquidity Changes
In this section, we analyze the changes in the prices, volumes, numbers of trades and transaction costs around rating changes. Figures 1 to 4 show the time-series of average prices and traded volumes in the time window 90 days before to 90 days after the events, for downgrades and upgrades, and for bonds issued by non-nancial and nancial rms (non-nancial and nancial bonds), respectively. Starting with downgrades, (see Figure 1 for non-nancial and Figure 2 for nancial bonds), we nd statistically signicant price reductions in all three periods around rating events. The strongest eect occurs in the crisis period for both non-nancial and nancial bonds, i.e., prices drop by around 6% of face value from 90 days before the event until the event 22 As a robustness check, we ran regressions considering rating events on the same day, from the same rating agency, to and from the same rating grade as separate events. In addition, we selected a set where only rating events that do not overlap with any other event are considered. Moreover, we also clustered standard errors by rm-event combinations (using dierent denitions of the clusters). We basically obtained similar results in these robustness checks (which are not presented in detail in the paper, but are available upon request). day itself, with a signicant proportion of the reduction taking place in a short interval around the event. The period before the crisis shows the lowest eect with a price move 90 days before the event of around 2%, and only a small reaction around the event day itself. The post-DoddFrank period lies in between, with the exception that, for nancial bonds, the price reactions are more similar to the period before the crisis. Considering trading volume, we nd that volume often spikes signicantly in a short period around the event day, increasing up to four times the average volume. This can be observed for all three periods in the case of non-nancial bonds.
However, for nancial bonds, we observe only a volume spike before the crisis. In general, the trading volumes before and after the event are in line with average trading volumes in the US corporate bond market (see, for example, Friewald et al. [2012] ).
Analyzing upgrades (see Figure 3 for non-nancial and Figure 4 for nancial bonds), we nd much smaller reactions of bond prices to the rating change announcements. In addition, we cannot observe particular price increases directly around the event days, but rather upward sloping price trends over the whole period. The only exception for nancial bonds is the crisis period, when in the rst 90 days, prices increase by 6%, however, again without any strong reaction on the event day. The trading volume shows a similar picture, i.e., we observe some increase in the trading volume around the event day for some periods, but the reaction is not as clear as for downgrades. Overall, we nd, as May [2010] documented earlier, that credit downgrades seem to elicit a stronger reaction than upgrades from market participants.
To analyze the hypotheses presented in Section 3, we provide a formal test of the price reactions. Table 3 reports price changes as a percentage of the face value of the bond, adjusted for changes in the risk-free rate and the results of the t-test and signed-rank test for downgrades and upgrades of nancial and non-nancial bonds, focusing on the price reaction directly around the event date (i.e., 5 days before to 5 days after the event date). 23 Analyzing the eects of downgrades, we nd that price changes before the crisis are relatively low: downgrades of non-nancial bonds have a decrease of -0.71%, whereas downgrades of nancial bonds experience a drop of -0.59%.
Moving to the crisis period in comparison, price variations become much stronger for all credit rating downgrades: -1.35% and -1.51% for non-nancial and nancial bonds, respectively. In both cases, the dierences between the two periods (i.e., -0.64 % for non-nancial and -0.92 % for nancial bonds) are statistically signicant. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 2, predicting a low market reaction (due to rating ination) in good times, especially for complex securities (e.g., nancial bonds), and a much stronger reaction due to an increase in informativeness in the crisis period. We nd that the eect doubles for non-nancial bonds and triples for nancial bonds. After Dodd-Frank, downgrades of non-nancial bonds have a relatively high price eect of -1.12%, which is comparable to the crisis period and much higher than before the crisis. The dierence between the periods after Dodd-Frank and before the crisis, which amounts to -0.41%, is again statistically signicant. This result is in line with Hypothesis 3, according to which rating changes after the Dodd-Frank Act should be more informative for the market, as rating-contingent regulation favoring high ratings was eliminated. Interestingly, for nancial bonds, downgrades have a much lower price impact than before the crisis, decreasing only by -0.31% of face value, which amounts to a statistically signicant dierence between the two periods of 0.28%. Thus, as predicted in Hypotheses 3, the increase in informativeness cannot be observed for all bonds, and is reversed in the case of nancial bonds, representing more complex securities.
As for upgrades, we nd statistically signicant price increases, as well, albeit on a much lower scale. Basically, the price reaction of an upgrade is only roughly 50% of the reaction of a downgrade in all periods. For non-nancial bonds, we nd price increases of 0.31%, 0.55% and 0.34%, respectively, in the three periods providing similar insights as the downgrades. 24 For nancial bonds, the results are 0.04%, 0.51% and 0.85%, respectively. 25 The main dierence compared to the downgrades of nancial bonds is that upgrades in the post Dodd-Frank period lead to rather strong price increases. A possible explanation for this price impact is the asymmetry of response with regard to litigation risk that has been created by Dodd-Frank. Following the argument presented in Section 3, it is much more likely for CRAs to be sued for an optimistically biased rating rather than for a pessimistic one, which leads to asymmetric penalties between biased downgrades and upgrades. CRAs are, therefore, much more reluctant to upgrade a bond for which they have acquired less information (i.e., for a complex security such as bond of nancial rms). Consequently, whenever they upgrade a bond, they must receive a clear signal that indicates an improvement in its credit quality. The market anticipates this possibility and, considering that CRAs have access to some level of private information, it reacts strongly whenever an upgrade occurs.
We analyze the reaction of bond market liquidity to credit rating changes, and, in Table 4 , we 24 In the case of upgrades of non-nancial bonds, the dierences across periods are only marginally signicant. 25 For upgrades of nancial bonds, the dierences between the periods are statistically signicant. present the changes in trading volume, trading frequency and price dispersion, and the results of the corresponding t-test and signed-rank test for both downgrades and upgrades of non-nancial and nancial bonds. For downgrades, we nd the strongest volume increase (around $2 millions) before the crisis for both non-nancial and nancial bonds (see Panel A and B). Considering the low price impact of these events, this result suggests that at least some of the trading is driven by clientele shifting due to the breaches of rating-contingent thresholds, rather than as a reaction to new information. During the crisis, volumes increase by $1.39 million and $0.43 million for non-nancial and nancial bonds, respectively. Thus, the high price reactions occur with a rather moderate increase in volumes, especially for nancial bonds, indicating lower market activity potentially because of higher sell-side pressure (see the discussion of transaction costs below). After Dodd-Frank, volume increases are high for non-nancial bonds at $1.59 million, and only moderate for nancial bonds, in line with the price reactions presented above.
For upgrades, we nd only moderate volume increases before the crisis, i.e., $0.45 million and $0.66 million, for non-nancial and nancial bonds, respectively, in line with the low price reactions. The strongest volume increase of around $1 million can be observed during the crisis, i.e., an upgrade might reduce the eects of sell-side pressure. After the Dodd-Frank Act, we nd a rather large increase in volume ($2.02 million) for nancial bonds, again in line with the price reactions. The change in the number of trades (presented in Panel C and D) shows a similar picture as the trading volume, i.e., we see a larger increase in the number of trades when the volume also increases. Table 4 show that all bond downgrades during the crisis are accompained by a statistically and economically signicant increase in transaction costs and, therefore, a lower level of liquidity, indicating sell-side pressure. 26 Downgrades during the crisis trigger an increase in transaction costs of 26.44 bp and 5.06 bp for non-nancial and nancial bonds, respectively.
Panel E and F of
Moreover, downgrades of non-nancial bonds lead to a 9 bp increase of transaction costs after Dodd-Frank, which is consistent with the higher price and volume impact observed for such bonds in that period. Note that, in our data, the average level of price dispersion in the 5 days before a downgrade is 72 bp.
Overall, we nd that, for non-nancial bonds, the price reactions increased after Dodd-Frank compared to before the crisis, whereas for nancial bonds, downgrades become less informative after Dodd-Frank. Trading activity and liquidity provide additional insights concerning the 26 We consider a variation in price dispersion of at least 5 bp to be economically relevant. reaction of market participants showing dierent levels of price reaction across the three periods.
Regression Analysis
In this section, we present the results of dierent regression models analyzing the price changes presented earlier. The rst set of regressions uses time-period dummies which allow us to conrm the tests of the previous section; in the second set, we run individual regressions for each period to analyze whether the impact of explanatory variables changes over time (see Section 5). In all these regressions, the dependent variable represents the price changes following downgrades, as these events turned out to be more important, based on the earlier analysis. 27 Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the regression models using time-period dummies for nonnancial and nancial bonds, respectively. In Model 1, rating variables, liquidity and trading activity are included. Model 2 instead has bond and rm characteristics. Model 3 includes all the variables taken together: this is our main benchmark for explaining the determinants of the bond price changes. Analyzing Model 3 for non-nancial bonds, we nd that during the crisis and after Dodd-Frank the informativeness of downgrades is higher than in the pre-crisis regime.
Specically, prices decrease 0.27% and 0.58% more in the crisis period, and after Dodd-Frank, respectively. However, only the After Dodd-Frank dummy is statistically signicant. The eect observed during the nancial crisis is captured mainly by liquidity (this eect will be discussed in more detail for the single-period regressions in Table 7 ). In addition, the analysis of the rating-related variables shows that downgrades have a weaker price impact when a bond is rated by a larger number of agencies. Interestingly, we nd a signicant eect for the rating threshold between investment and speculative grade: the price change following such a downgrade has -1.01% larger decline. Considering liquidity and trading activity, an increase in the transaction cost and trading frequency is related to a stronger price impact of downgrades (i.e., a one standard-deviation changes lead to price changes for these three variables of -0,50% and -0.34%, respectively). Additionally, we nd a slightly weaker reaction for bonds with a longer time to maturity. Finally, non-nancial bonds with higher coupons experience a stronger price decrease when they are downgraded, possibly representing bonds with greater credit and liquidity risk.
In the case of the results from regression models for downgrades of nancial bonds, we nd, based on the time-period dummies in the full model, that the crisis period is associated with a larger decrease in prices by 0.68%, following a downgrade, consistent with our hypothesis 2 and the results of the price tests. Although positive, the post-Dodd-Frank dummy is not statistically dierent from the period before the crisis. Thus, the nding that Dodd-Frank improves informativeness only for non-nancial bonds is conrmed: the informativeness of nancial bonds is, at best, as low as the period before the crisis. Analyzing the rating-related variables, we nd a stronger reaction following downgrades of Moody's, which might be driven by the fact that Moody's is the only agency which takes into account recovery after default in its ratings methodology, which could be more relevant for nancial bonds. Downgrades from investment to speculative grade do lead to a stronger reaction; however, these eects are only marginally signicant. Trading activity and liquidity variables provide similar eects compared to those for non-nancial bonds. Analyzing rm and bond characteristics, we nd a size eect: the greater the amount issued of a bond, the lower is the price reaction following a downgrade.
Two important issues are not covered in this set of results. First, it would be interesting to know whether the eect of credit downgrades/upgrades on the regulatory threshold changed after the introduction of Dodd-Frank, when this threshold was no longer legally binding. 28 Second, Hypothesis 2 stresses the importance of liquidity in relation to price changes during the nancial crisis. From this perspective, knowing whether or not the liquidity eect is constant across time periods provides a useful insight regarding the relation between corporate bond prices and liquidity, when rating changes occur. We tackle both issues in the second set of regressions that provide individual estimations for the three periods. Table 7 shows the results of these regressions. Focusing rst on the rating threshold, we nd that in the case of non-nancial bonds, the negative coecient obtained in the rst set of regressions is solely driven by the years before the crisis. After Dodd-Frank, being downgraded from investment to speculative grade does not lead to greater price reactions, as Dodd-Frank has progressively weakened rating-contingent regulation. Considering nancial bonds, consistent with the results of Tables 5 and 6, we nd that downgrades from investment to speculative grade do not play as important a role for nancial bonds as for non-nancial bonds. Moving to the analysis of liquidity, we nd that in the case of non-nancial bonds, the liquidity eect comes mostly from the crisis period, i.e., the transaction cost variable is statistically signicant. This result is consistent with the tests of liquidity in Table 4 , where a strong increase in transaction costs is observed during the nancial crisis. This supports the idea that liquidity captures the stronger price reactions for non-nancial bonds over the crisis period, consistent with the discussion of the results of Table   5 . In addition, trading volume also has a signicant eect after Dodd-Frank, consistent with the plots in Figure 1 . A strong liquidity eect during the crisis is also present for nancial bonds, which is, again, in line with the tests on liquidity previously discussed. In the case of nancial bonds, liquidity and trading activity also have a statistically signicant impact on prices in the other periods. However, the eect is, overall, smaller compared to the crisis period. All other variables provide similar results to those in the rst set of regressions.
Implied Ratings Analysis
In this section, we analyze whether rating changes are anticipated by market participants, and if this expectation is dierent across the three periods. We estimate a market-implied rating before the rating event by comparing the yield of the particular bond with the observed yields in the various rating classes based on all bonds in the market (see Section 5). This market-implied rating is compared to the actual rating of the bond before the events. If a credit rating change occurs unexpectedly, this dierence is zero; otherwise, there is a negative dierence when credit downgrades are anticipated, and similarly a positive dierence for anticipated upgrades. Table 8 shows the average dierences for downgrades and upgrades separately for non-nancial and nancial bonds. Starting with downgrades, we nd that before the crisis, rating changes are anticipated in the market, i.e., on average, the dierence is -0.85 and -1.30 notches for non-nancial and nancial bonds, respectively. Thus, for nancial bonds the anticipation is signicantly stronger. During the crisis, we basically observe no anticipation. After Dodd-Frank, there is no economically signcant anticipation, as well, i.e., the average dierence is -0.21 and -0.14 notches, for non-nancial and nancial bonds, respectively. Based on the previous nding, we assume dierent reasons for this observation: for non-nancial bonds, this could be a result of the higher informativeness of the ratings (as market prices react on the change), and for nancial bonds, it could be a simple consequence of downgrading bonds immediately, in line with publicly available information without increasing the informativeness of rating changes (as market prices do not react), as legal claims in a tort case could be based on such rating dierences.
The results for upgrades in the table are interesting, as well. Comparing the time periods before the crisis and after Dodd-Frank, we nd that after Dodd-Frank the expectation of upgrades is higher, i.e., on average 0.21 vs 1.09 for non-nancial bonds, and 1.08 vs 1.98 for nancial bonds, respectively. Thus, before the crisis, ratings were rather quickly adjusted for good news, whereas after Dodd-Frank, rating agencies turned more reluctant to upgrade, especially for nancial bonds. Again, this result could be a direct consequence of the asymmetric litigation risk in Dodd-Frank.
Overall, we nd that the anticipation of rating changes is dierent in the three time periods. In particular, we nd that credit downgrades were anticipated before the crisis, but not after DoddFrank. Thus, the staleness of ratings before credit downgrades disappeared after the introduction of new regulation. However, CRAs are now more reluctant to upgrade bonds, as a consequence of the potential litigation risk, in the event of a lawsuit for damages. In general, these results are in line with the observed price changes and the hypotheses discussed.
Conclusion
The nancial crisis in 2008-2009 and the subsequent regulatory changes introduced by DoddFrank are two recent events that heavily aected the credit rating industry, rst, by bringing into question the informativeness of credit ratings and second, by eliminating rating-contingent regulation and increasing litigation risk. One of the markets most heavily aected by these events is the US corporate bond market. In this market, CRAs play an important role in assessing the credit risk, as private credit information is not easily available to investors. In addition, this market represents an ideal laboratory as virtually all transaction data are available.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of rating changes on prices and liquidity of US corporate bonds from 2003 to 2014. Our data set covers three important periods: rating changes before the crisis, during the nancial crisis and recession, and after Dodd-Frank. Moreover, we analyze nancial bonds and non-nancial bonds separately. We nd that the informativeness of rating changes is generally low before the crisis, and nancial bonds are less informative than nonnancial bonds. Furthermore, the informativeness increases during the crisis, together with a high level of illiquidity in relation with all downgrades. After Dodd-Frank, credit rating changes lead to a signicantly stronger market reaction for non-nancial bonds, whereas we nd a weaker reaction for nancial bonds, indicating that the new regulatory framework has ambiguous eects depending on the complexity of the securities. These results are consistent with the predictions of the existing theoretical models, such as Skreta and Veldkamp [2009] and Opp et al. [2013] . A regression analysis additionally shows the importance of rating-contingent thresholds before the introduction of Dodd-Frank. Finally, we analyze ratings implied by market yields, nding that downgrades are less anticipated after Dodd-Frank than before the crisis, whereas the opposite holds for upgrades. This suggests that Dodd-Frank might have eliminated stale overly optimistic ratings that were released before the crisis. However, the asymmetric penalties imposed by Dodd-Frank make CRAs potentially reluctant to upgrade bonds immediately.
Overall, our paper contributes to the understanding of how the eect of credit ratings changes on US corporate bonds has varied in dierent economic environments, particularly after the introduction of Dodd-Frank. We provide new evidence by analyzing trading activity and liquidity surrounding downgrades/upgrades covering the whole market, going well beyond the existing literature. Our results may be of interest to policy makers, in order evaluate the eciency of existing regulations and market participants to adapt their investment and risk management strategies to the new regulatory framework.
Appendix: Structural Break Test
In this section, we provide tests to identify structural breaks in the price variations of US corporate bonds surrounding rating changes, in our time period from January 2003 to May 2014.
Such tests allow us to evaluate the choice of the three time periods (see 5.1).
The most basic test for structural breaks is the Chow Test, introduced by Chow [1960] . It is designed for time series, and it allows to identify a single break at a known time point t * . Consider the regression models y t = x β + t and y t = x β t + δ t x γ + t , where δ t is dummy which equals 1 if t < t * . Under the null of no structural break at t * , which is equivalent to γ = 0, the test statistic is given by
where RSS 1 and RSS 2 are the residual sum of squares of the rst and the second regression models presented above, respectively. T is the point of the last observation in the time-series and k is the number of regressors. The test statistic has a χ 2 distribution with k and T − 2k degrees of freedom and it rejects the null hypothesis when it is too large. A limitation of the Chow test is given by the fact that the break date needs to be specied. The structural break F-test described in Andrews [1993] overcomes this problem and allows to test for a structural break at an unknown point in time. The basic idea here is to extend the Chow test by calculating the Chow test statistic for all the potential breakpoints in a given interval [t, t] . t identies observation n in the time series, where n > k, and conversely t is observation T − n, where T is the last observation. The test statistic is given by
which has a non-standard pivotal distribution that depends on the number of parameters and dates tested. We apply this test based on our regression model presented in 5.3. Given that the test is designed for time series, we create a monthly time series of our model by taking the average of the price changes and all the regressors in each month of our sample period.
In the presentation of the results, we focus on price changes of downgrades for nancial and non-nancial bonds. However, the tests concerning upgrades provide a similar picture. Figure   5 summarizes our results and presents the time series of the F-statistics covering the full period in the two upper plots and the time series of sub-periods in the two lower plots, separately for nancial and non-nancial bonds. Starting with the full time series of the F-statistics for nancial bonds, we nd a sharp increase during the crisis period, particularly around the Lehman default, in line with our result of more signicant price changes in this period. Interestingly, the F-statistic drops below the pre-crisis level after the introduction of Dodd-Frank. Considering non-nancial bonds, we again nd an increase around the Lehman default; however, there is a second sharp increase after the introduction of Dodd-Frank. Thus, we nd important dierences between nancial and non-nancial bonds as in our analysis of price and liquidity changes.
Applying the test to these F-statistics based on the whole time-series, we basically nd a structural break in the nancial crisis around the Lehman default, conrming that the nancial crisis leads to signicant dierence in the market reaction. However, as the test can only identify one structural break and we are particularly interested in whether an additional structural break occurred after the introduction of Dodd-Frank, we separately analyze a sub-period spanning only the crisis and the post Dodd-Frank period. These results are presented in the two lower plots.
We nd for both nancial and non-nancial bonds that a structural break occurs in mid 2010 (in July for nancials and in April for non-nancial bonds). The F-statistics are signicantly lower for nancial and higher for non-nancial bonds after the break. Thus, these results support our choice of the time periods conrming that a structural break occurred directly around the introduction of Dodd-Frank. Summary Statistics of Downgrades and Upgrades.
The table shows how the rating events are distributed in our sample. The table reports the rating of the bond after the downgrade/upgrade. Rating is a variable which assigns integer values to the dierent rating grades, starting from 1 for the highest till 21 for the lowest. Moreover, it is divided across rating grades, type of events (downgrades, upgrades), bond issuers (nancial and non-nancial), and time periods (before the crisis, during the crisis and after Dodd-Frank). We obtain the ratings from Mergent FISD and the daily bond transactions from TRACE. The sample period is divided in before the crisis The table shows the results of dierent regression models, where the dependent variable is the risk-free adjusted dierence between the average of the mean volume weighted daily price across the 5 days before the event and the average across the event day and the 5 days after. The explanatory variables are given by time period-dummies (nancial crisis, after Dodd-Frank), rating-related variables (rating number, rating dispersion, number of agencies, notches, regulatory threshold dummy, Moody's dummy, Standard and Poor's dummy), changes in liquidity and trading activity (change in price dispersion, change in volume, change in trading frequency), bond and rm characteristics (time to maturity, coupon, amount issued, log(total assets), intangible assets/total assets). The table shows the results of dierent regression models, where the dependent variable is the risk-free adjusted dierence between the average of the mean volume weighted daily price across the 5 days before the event and the average across the event day and the 5 days after. The explanatory variables are given by time period-dummies (nancial crisis, after Dodd-Frank), rating-related variables (rating number, rating dispersion, number of agencies, notches, regulatory threshold dummy, Moody's dummy, Standard and Poor's dummy), changes in liquidity and trading activity (change in price dispersion, change in volume, change in trading frequency), bond and rm characteristics (time to maturity, coupon, amount issued, log(total assets), intangible assets/total assets). The table shows the results of dierent regression models, where the dependent variable is the risk-free adjusted dierence between the average of the mean volume weighted daily price across the 5 days before the event and the average across the event day and the 5 days after. The explanatory variables are given by time period-dummies (nancial crisis, after Dodd-Frank), rating-related variables (rating number, rating dispersion, number of agencies, notches, regulatory threshold dummy, Moody's dummy, Standard and Poor's dummy), changes in liquidity and trading activity (change in price dispersion, change in volume, change in trading frequency), bond and rm characteristics (time to maturity, coupon, amount issued, log(total assets), intangible assets/total assets). Implied Rating Analysis
The table shows the average dierence between the rating of the bonds before the downgrade/upgrade and the market-implied rating. The market-implied rating is calculated from bond market yields over a time interval between 30 and 90 days before the rating change. Rating is a variable which assigns integer values to the dierent rating grades, starting from 1 for the highest till 21 for the lowest. 
